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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Historical Context 
 
British agriculture has been a heavily supported sector since the Second World 
War, first through domestic support and since the 1970s under the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP).  The common themes of these policies have been to 
expand output by easing the (private) costs of adopting new productivity-
oriented technologies, through a mixture of grants and input subsides; and to 
ensure adequate income levels in farming, through high product prices 
maintained by intervention buying and import barriers.  Since the mid 1980s, 
however, policy emphasis has shifted somewhat in response to three factors 
(Buckwell, 1990; Whitby, 1994, 1996; Winter and Gaskell, 1997). 
 
First, the budgetary costs of maintaining open-ended CAP support became 
unacceptably high.  This led, for example, to the imposition of milk quotas and 
grain co-responsibility levies during the 1980s.  Second, the consequences of 
the subsidised export of Europe’s growing farm surpluses ensured that 
agricultural trade became a subject of intense scrutiny during the Uruguay 
Round of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  This, together 
with continuing budgetary pressures, led to a general (but phased) lowering of 
price support and protection measures under the 'MacSharry' reforms of the 
CAP initiated in 1992.  Third, the environmental impacts of agriculture gained 
in importance as a political issue.  This led to the introduction of agri-
environmental measures under the CAP, starting with Article 19 of the 
Structures Regulation 797/85 (which established Environmentally Sensitive 
Areas) and broadening out to the Agri-Environment Regulation 2078/92, one 
of three 'Accompanying Measures' to the MacSharry reforms. 
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1.2  Environmental Management  
 
Despite these shifts in policy emphasis, the environmental impacts of 
productivist agriculture are still accumulating.  Whereas farming practices and 
estate management over preceding centuries are credited with creating 'valued' 
habitats and landscapes, agricultural intensification in the post-war period is 
widely held responsible for the steep decline in the area of semi-natural 
habitats, the populations of associated farmland wildlife species and the 
diversity of landscape structures (NCC, 1990).  That is, either through 
destructive action or simply the absence of positive management, contemporary 
practices are degrading and depleting the stock of agri-environmental natural 
capital3 accumulated by previous generations.  For example, the 35 years 
following the Second World War witnessed the loss of 95% of lowland herb-
rich grasslands, 50% of ancient woodlands and 33% of all upland grasslands, 
heaths and mires (NCC, 1984; Barr et al., 1993). 
 
Typically, pockets of natural capital remain only as fragmented features at the 
margin of modern agriculture, often where biophysical constraints preclude 
intensive practices, for example in waterlogged lowland sites or remote and 
exposed upland areas.  Contemporary maintenance of the fragmented natural 
capital base is attempted primarily through specific schemes for environmental 
land management.  Participation of land managers in such schemes is typically 
voluntary and time-limited, resulting in scarce funds being used to 'buy' what 
may only be temporary alleviation of environmental degradation or damage at 
that site (Moxey et al, 1995).  This reflects the pre-eminence of agricultural 
interests over environmental interests, and the success of the former in keeping 
                                                 
3
  Used here as an umbrella term encompassing notions of biodiversity, landscape structure and pattern,  and 
cultural heritage [Atkinson, 1994, 1995; Whitby and Adger, 1996, 1997].     
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control of property rights in the countryside (Cox et al, 1990).  Such schemes 
include Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs), Environmentally Sensitive 
Areas and, more recently, Countryside Stewardship. 
 
As Tilzey (1997) notes, this approach revolves around the notion that natural 
capital can be conserved or enhanced on a site-by-site basis, without reference 
to the broader spatial (environmental) or sectoral (socio-economic) context.  It 
does nothing to address natural capital conservation in the remaining 
countryside beyond protected sites/areas.  Thus, conservation efforts are 
typically remedial in nature, treating specific and discrete symptoms of an 
intensive agricultural system without attempting, or indeed having the scope, to 
address the underlying causes.  However, sites cannot be conserved in 
isolation; they are adversely affected by the condition of surrounding land 
whose treatment is driven by socio-economic forces that extend well beyond 
the local level (Turner and Gardner, 1991; Naiman, 1992). Environmental 
connectivity in landscapes requires that management for conservation be 
conducted over a range of spatial scales, not just at the individual site level.  
Likewise, awareness of the complexity of socio-economic forces driving land 
use and the inter-linkages and substitution possibilities between different 
commodity regimes and markets, reveals the need to address generic causes of 
land use change (O'Callaghan, 1996; Dabbert et al, 1998). 
 
Accommodating these broad scale considerations would represent a radical 
shift away from the current 'environmental managerialist' position to a more 
holistic, whole countryside approach (see, for example, Naiman, 1992; 
Midmore et al, 1996).  That is, rather than treating symptoms, efforts to 
conserve and enhance the agri-environmental natural capital base would be 
directed towards tackling the causes of environmentally damaging or degrading 
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practices.  The analogy here with health policies is evident: prevention may 
well be more attractive and desirable than having to fund expensive cures. 
 
1.3 The Present Situation Regarding the Greening of the  CAP 
 
An assessment of the MacSharry reforms indicates that they have not 
incorporated conservation objectives into the strategic direction of the CAP.  
The following are the key conclusions from a review of the implementation of 
those reforms in the UK. 
 
The implementation of the 1992 CAP reforms was phased in over a 3-4 year 
period and coincided with other major events, which greatly affected the 
economic climate for agriculture.  These have swamped the impact of the 
reforms whose consequences are more difficult to discern.  The reforms are 
also operating in a somewhat altered agricultural situation from that prevailing 
when they were formulated and are having to address problems not then 
envisaged. 
 
One of the major events that has greatly affected British agriculture since the 
introduction of the MacSharry reforms was Britain’s withdrawal from the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM).  That event, coupled with a tightening of 
world grain supplies, confounded the expectation of reduced profitability in the 
cereal sector following the reforms.  The implementation of the reforms over 
the first three years coincided with high world grain prices which boosted 
farmers’ incomes significantly.  In addition, British farmers were shielded from 
the effects of cuts in cereal support prices by successive devaluations of the 
green pound. For UK cereal producers, the years following 1992 turned out in 
fact to be highly profitable ones (Asby and Sturgess, 1997).  Of course, they 
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may not be able to count on such favourable conditions in the future (indeed, 
aggregate incomes have declined by 45% between 1996 and 1997, mainly due 
to lower commodity prices (MAFF, 1998), but in the meantime there has been a 
significant boost to intensification and specialisation. 
 
Another major event with more profound and longer term consequences is the 
BSE crisis.  The reforms in the beef regime were intended to bring the supply 
and demand for beef back into equilibrium.  The drop in demand following the 
crisis has frustrated that objective.  At the same time the efforts to reduce cattle 
numbers have been greatly overtaken by the slaughtering programmes 
introduced in reaction to the BSE crisis.  The result is a large reduction in the 
UK beef sector with serious consequences for the agricultural economy and the 
rural environment. 
 
1.3.1 The Agri-Environment Regulation as a Minor Component of the CAP 
 
Agri-environment expenditure, particularly when narrowed down to the sub-
category of actual payments to farmers, remains very low in comparison with 
the overall size of the UK’s agricultural economy and in comparison with total 
CAP expenditure in the UK.  In 1995-96, for example, agri-environment 
payments to farmers in the UK as a whole amounted to nearly £55 million, or 
1.9% of total CAP expenditure in the UK of about £2.91 billion (MAFF, 1998).  
Although agri-environment expenditure has expanded progressively over the 
past ten years, and is set to expand further in the next three years, there will be 
little prospect of a sizeable shift towards environmentally-friendly farming 
practices until there is a more widespread balance between agri-environmental 
incentives and the production incentives in the traditional CAP regimes.  As it 
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is, commodity supports effectively inhibit the take-up of agri-environment 
measures.   
 
The bulk of expenditure under the agri-environment regulation is on ESAs, 
followed by Countryside Stewardship (accounting respectively for 59% and 
20% of UK expenditure in 1996-97). This means that the UK implementation 
of the Regulation has been very particular.  In essence, Britain is still largely 
implementing on an expanded scale a policy devised under Article 19 of 
797/85.  The lack of a general extensification scheme (such as the French 
‘prime à l’herbe’), the restricted interpretation of some measures such as that 
for organic farming (which is used to support organic conversion but not 
production) and the limited take-up of some schemes (such as the ones for 
countryside access and moorland conservation) all have the effect of 
constraining the growth of agri-environment policy in the UK.  Arguably this 
reflects a UK preoccupation, in the development of agri-environment policy, to 
solve discrete and specific environmental problems through proscribed and 
targeted measures rather than address the generic causes of agriculture’s 
pressures on the environment or see agri-environment policy as playing a more 
strategic role in reorienting the CAP. 
 
There are certain perverse consequences.  The most important is that any 
beneficial effects of the agri-environment regulation are likely to be swamped 
by the environmental impact of the rest of the CAP.  There is a risk also that the 
intricacies of implementing the Regulation will distract attention from the 
bigger picture.  Thus considerable resources have been devoted to monitoring 
and evaluating agri-environmental measures, but little to the environment 
impact of the CAP commodity regimes. 
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1.3.2 Deintensification in the Beef and Sheep Sectors 
 
The impact of the reforms coupled with BSE is leading to a deintensification of 
livestock production.  However, the environmental consequences are mixed 
and uncertain.  Reduced grazing pressures are not necessarily leading to the 
revitalisation of degraded moor and grassland.  Likewise, semi-natural habitats, 
including species rich pastures, need active management, and the withdrawal of 
livestock may lead to unwanted environmental changes.  In parts of the UK, 
livestock numbers are falling below desirable levels from a land 
management/conservation point of view.  The interaction between the different 
commodity regimes may actually be exacerbating matters, for example, by 
encouraging farmers to specialise in sheep or beef to maximise their returns 
from the different schemes on offer.  Stocking rate rules have been introduced 
to help correlate the separate livestock regimes geographically.  However, the 
rules are not designed to achieve environmental benefits but to constrain 
support costs and the available evidence suggests that the extensification 
mechanisms are not working.  
 
1.3.3 Farm Investment and Environmental Pressures 
 
Arable area payments and other commodity supports are making a vastly 
greater financial injection into farm businesses than are agri-environment 
measures.  By encouraging additional investment in mechanisation, 
amalgamation and specialisation, they may be stimulating yet more 
environmental damage.  Previously, the general downward trend in farm 
incomes since the mid-1970s had not only encouraged farmers to look for 
alternative income sources but had diminished the rate of investment in 
agriculture.  In fact depreciation exceeded gross fixed capital formation over 
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several years.  After 1993, though, the position was reversed slightly, as Table 
1 shows. 
 
Table 1 Impact of CAP reform on Income and Investment in UK 
Agriculture 
          £ million 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
(provisional) 
Net Farm Income 3,384 3,407 4,276 4,101 2,276 
Depreciation 1,680 1,730 1,838 1939 1,968 
Gross Capital Formation1,652 1,893 1,980 2,048 n.a. 
Source: MAFF, 1998 
 
1.4  Policy Opportunities and Research Needs 
 
The current policy arena offers both opportunities for, and threats to, achieving 
a significant shift in the focus and scale of agri-environmental management 
policy. The forthcoming World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations are 
expected to achieve further lowering of agricultural price supports.  On the one 
hand, this could benefit the farmed environment through reductions in 
production intensity and through scope for replacing production incentives 
with measures to enhance environmental attributes.  On the other, as Potter 
(1996) argues, lower agricultural support may lead to structural changes, such 
as land abandonment or farm amalgamation, which could actually jeopardise 
the remaining stock of natural capital.  Moreover, WTO rules may not 
necessarily endorse environmental supports (Sinner et al, 1993; Tikof et al, 
1997).  First, the jointness in production between agricultural products and 
many desired environmental attributes means that it may be impossible to 
decouple environmental supports from food production without it being 
perceived as trade-distorting.  Second, demonstrating that desired 
environmental outcomes are being, or could be, delivered by the measures in 
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place is a non-trivial task that may be necessary but not sufficient to win WTO 
approval, given that WTO has yet to announce its rules. 
 
Knowledge and understanding of agricultural land use change and its 
environmental consequences remain imperfect, as does knowledge and 
understanding of the effect of environmental policies on agriculture and the 
wider rural economy.  Whilst significant advances have been made in recent 
years, not least by the attempts to combine the insights offered by different 
disciplines, empirical and conceptual gaps still remain.  Thus, for example, 
environmental scientists attempt to reconcile sparse data with possibly ill-
conditioned, or at least poorly identified, systems (Jakeman et al, 1993); 
agricultural economists are still grappling with how to derive, from data on 
aggregate land use change, the spatial pattern of change (Wilson and Birkin, 
1987; Verdiesan and Moxey, 1994); and other social scientists seek to clarify 
the complex relationships between farmers’ attitudes, technological choices 
and farming practices (Lowe et al, 1990).  Such gaps feature in an ongoing 
research agenda, yet needs to be acknowledged in the design and promotion of 
policies aimed at achieving an environmentally and economically sustainable 
agriculture. 
 
The dilemma facing policy makers is that they possess sufficient information to 
reveal a problem, but insufficient information to apply policy solutions with 
any certainty (Reichelderfer, 1991; Constanza et al, 1992).  The use of 
environmental indicators is one response to this problem that has been adopted 
by various parties.  The remainder of this report reviews the theoretical and 
empirical nature of indicators.  The discussion is structured around the 
emergence of indicators as a contemporary policy tool and their potential 
application to a set of agri-environmental policies in the UK. 
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2.  THE DEMAND FOR INDICATORS 
 
2.1  Pressure for Measuring Public Sector Performance 
 
Indicators in general - and not just environmental indicators - have increasingly 
become a tool of regulation.  This development reflects a number of broader 
shifts in society and governance which need to be understood if the 
contemporary role of indicators is to be appreciated.  Perhaps the most 
fundamental of these shifts are pressures to measure and assess the 
performance of public authorities and, related to this, growing attention to 
certain problems whose very intractability raises doubts about the effectiveness 
of public policy and present forms of intervention. 
 
Thus, on the one hand, changing attitudes have led to public services being 
increasingly judged alongside commercial services and therefore being 
required to be responsive to public demands and considerations of cost-
effectiveness.  This is part of a shift from a welfare state to a consumer-oriented 
society.  Not only does this represent a change in the nature of the public 
demands to which government must respond (towards more complex, more 
exacting and more particularistic demands) but also a change in the role of 
government, from the monopoly provider of public services to that of guardian 
of the public interest in a mixed and pluralistic economy dominated by service 
provision. 
 
These developments also stem, on the other hand, from the perceived failure of 
past public policies and state structures to tackle fundamental problems.  In 
some cases the response has been the privatisation of previously public 
services; and in others, the establishment of public agencies at arm’s length 
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from government.  The requirement for government then to monitor and 
evaluate service providers necessitates the setting of targets and performance 
measures.  The consequent fragmentation of authority, the plurality of 
providers and the complexity of public demands also require clear objectives 
and measures of performance for whole systems or policy domains, against 
which to judge the contributions of individual agencies or programmes.  Forms 
of performance evaluation that were subject only to internal reference, 
essentially through measures of policy inputs or outputs, have to be externally 
referenced in relation to actual outcomes (i.e. the objective societal 
consequences of policy interventions).  In terms of conventional appraisal 
methodology, where marginal changes are considered in terms of their marginal 
contribution to costs and benefits, this is part of a shift in emphasis towards 
concern for the effectiveness of public policy. 
 
Part of the complexity of contemporary public demands concerns problems and 
issues that cross-cut traditional policy sectors organised on a functional basis - 
issues such as competitiveness, equal opportunities, the health of the nation 
and, of course, the environment.  Such generic issues cannot be addressed 
solely within established sectors.  Indeed, the functional divisions within and 
between sectors may actually exacerbate them.  Appropriate solutions 
necessitate co-ordinated action across sectors and organisations.  That requires 
explicit strategies, and again calls for performance measures that transcend 
particular policies and programmes.  This is not simply a technical exercise but 
involves opening up previously closed sectoral policy communities to wider 
scrutiny and influence. 
 
It is widely recognised, for example, that governments alone cannot solve the 
more pervasive environmental problems.  Concerted action across society is 
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called for, including industry, voluntary organisations, communities and 
households.  Notions such as the green consumer and the ethical business use 
individual citizens and firms as policy actors.  ‘Command and control’ forms of 
regulation give way to means of empowering and informing responsible 
organisations and citizens to monitor themselves and others.  As a result, the 
density of environmental information in circulation has increased enormously 
in recent years.  This has been true in both specialist and general public 
domains.  In some fields, such as environmental auditing, eco-labelling, or 
environmental impact assessment of development proposals, the roles of this 
information are multiple, ranging from better planning and decision-making, to 
more environmentally responsible decisions by consumers and investors.  This 
information, duly sieved by gatekeepers, has thus acquired a new normative, as 
well as regulatory, function.  It is also claimed that information is playing a 
critical role in the emergence of a different type of civil society - one 
characterised by what Giddens (1991) terms reflexivity i.e. a growing 
consciousness on the part of groups and individuals in society of the 
determinants and consequences of their actions  (Lowe, 1990).  These issues 
are more fully developed in Sections 4 and 5. 
 
2.2  International Pressures 
 
Pressures for performance monitoring are not confined within national 
boundaries.  Transnational regulation has grown considerably as part of the 
globalisation process.  This involves states establishing common rules and 
frameworks for action.  Such transnational regulation requires explicit 
objectives coupled with monitoring procedures to allow the performance of 
states to be objectively judged and mutually scrutinised.  The establishment of 
a liberalised international trading regime has been a key driving force, and 
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concern that domestic environmental policies might distort trade has been a 
major factor in the growth of international environmental law.  The need to 
address transnational and global environmental problems has also stimulated 
concerted action between states.  The expanding array of international 
agreements in the environmental field has called for transnationally comparable 
data to help states compare their performance and assess the compliance of 
others: hence the prominence of various international agencies in indicator 
work. 
 
Contemporary efforts to define and derive environmental indicators stem from 
debates about sustainability, initiated and progressed by many individuals and 
agencies but popularised by the 1987 World Commission on Environment and 
Development (the 'Brundtland Report'; WCED, 1987) and the 1992 UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (the 'Rio Earth Summit,  Agenda 
21'; UN, 1993).  These events have spawned many initiatives to research and 
implement sustainable indicators (Pearce et al, 1993).  High profile examples 
include: OECD's work programme on 'next-generation' environmental 
economics and indicators (OECD, 1991, 1997); the UN Environment 
Programme (UNEP, 1997; http://unep.unep.no/); and the UN Commission on 
Sustainable Development  (UN, 1996). 
 
For Britain, the most significant arena for the internationalisation of policy and 
law has been the European Union.  It is estimated that 80% of our 
environmental legislation has its origins in Brussels and Strasbourg (Gummer, 
1994).  There have undoubtedly been significant changes in the procedures and 
principles of environmental policy as a result of European integration.  
European directives have required that absolute legal standards be put in place 
for a range of environmental parameters.  This has involved a shift from 
 14 
flexibility to formality in formulating and implementing the objectives of 
environmental policy.  A common European framework, coupled with legal 
standards to be met over proscribed timetables has greatly reduced the scope 
for discretion in implementation and has helped create a more transparent 
system that is much more open to public and judicial scrutiny.  This has 
necessitated making explicit the principles upon which environmental 
protection is based and the criteria upon which its achievements may be judged.  
The specific needs for standardised data for policy making and compliance 
monitoring on an EU-wide basis has thrown up a separate organisation, the 
European Environment Agency, dedicated to this purpose (Lowe and Ward, 
1998).  Within the EU's Fifth Environmental Action Plan, Eurostat and the 
European Environment Agency are jointly running the Environmental Pressure 
Indices Project (http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/eurostat/; EEA, 1995; Stanners 
and Bourdeau, 1995). 
 
2.3  The Role of Indicators 
 
To clarify the role of environmental indicators it is necessary to consider the 
way in which public decisions about the environment are taken.  All of the 
developments mentioned above are eroding traditional sources of authority and 
diffusing power.  Policy and regulatory systems in place today rely less on in-
house expertise and closed consultation with affected interests, and are more 
oriented towards transparency of performance against explicit and formalised 
standards.  The formalisation of the role of environmental information, through 
monitoring and reporting procedures, has exposed regulation to public scrutiny 
and has opened up previously closed policy communities thus bringing that 
information forcibly to bear on the policy process.  In essence, indicators are 
one way in which certain central policy actors are seeking to cope with these 
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contemporary trends and developments.  Indicators must be seen therefore as a 
means not as an end, and their utility should be judged in relation to the ends 
that they serve.  Largely, those ends are to do with the exercise of inter-
organisational control within complex systems of governance, where traditional 
hierarchical and monolithic forms of authority (such as state sovereignty or 
closed policy communities) have been eroded.  In such situations, in which 
power is more diffuse and less hierarchical, a variety of actors may be seeking 
to assert control over others or to retain their own autonomy.  Indicators cannot 
therefore be a neutral tool.  The choice of indicators and the way they are 
deployed only make sense in terms of wider organisational and regulatory 
strategies. 
 
Within organisations, indicators are a means of coping with a surfeit of 
information. The capacity  to absorb information by those charged with making 
public decisions is finite.  To the extent that they can delegate to lower level 
staff the tasks of selecting, digesting and preparing information, to make it 
readily comprehensible without losing critical content, they will do so.  This is 
never entirely a technical process unaffected by organisational or political 
imperatives or even the private goals of those involved.  Indeed, those who use 
the indicators must have confidence in them and they must command a wider 
legitimacy (MacNaughton et al, 1997).  This raises three major issues. 
 
First, transparency.  To be accepted by decision-makers and be persuasive to 
the informed public, the reasoning behind the choice of an indicator and the 
process by which it is derived from available data both need to be transparent.  
This places the onus upon designers of indicators not only to be competent 
scientifically, but also to be able to argue or present indicators to a (possibly) 
non-technical audience.  This poses difficulties where the underlying science is 
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complex.  It also poses difficulties where the degree of processing of raw data 
is significant, a point discussed further in Section 3.2. 
 
Second, relevance and ownership.  To be used as an indicator, a piece of 
information has to be relevant to an organisational decision-maker.  Moreover, 
the organisation has to perceive some self-capability to monitor the indicator 
and/or influence the value of the indicator through (positive) action.  If an 
offered indicator does not appear relevant, or is perceived to be beyond the 
organisation’s sphere of influence, it is unlikely to be accepted.  This is a 
potential problem in agri-environmental systems where there are myriad 
decision-makers operating at different levels, from farmers at ground level to 
policy makers at regional, national and international level.  It is unlikely even if 
the phenomenon addressed is common, that one indicator will be accepted by 
all these agents.  This suggests that different indicators may be required for 
different organisational decision-makers.   
 
Third, there is the issue of the public legitimacy of indicators (see Chapters 8 
and 40 of Agenda 21 (UN, 1993)). If they are to command wider acceptance, 
they must seem relevant and impartial beyond their immediate users.  This 
poses problems since, ultimately, all indicators are used normatively in that 
they are selected to fulfil organisational and policy purposes.  The question is 
whether value judgements or organisational perspectives are built into the 
indicators (i.e. internalised), or retained externally as in the political setting of 
standards, targets and so forth. 
 
These issues point to the need for dialogue between the designers of indicators, 
users of indicators, and other stakeholders.  Designers need some appreciation 
of the decision (e.g. policy) making process and the managerial opportunities 
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and constraints, including the fact that elevation of information to the status of 
an indicator will possibly induce behavioural responses from people i.e. 
reactivity (Fitz-Gibbon, 1990).  Decision-makers need some appreciation of the 
theoretical and empirical basis for the choice and design of indicators. 
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3. THE NATURE AND CHOICE OF INDICATORS 
 
3.1  Definitions of Indicators 
 
Different agencies and different authors each supply their own working 
definitions of indicators.  Hence, Gallopín (1997) reports that indicators are 
referred to variously as: variables; parameters; measures; statistical measures; 
proxy measures; values; meters or measuring instruments; fractions; indices; a 
piece of information; empirical models of reality; signs.  The common theme 
running through this list is that indicators are a vehicle for summarising, or 
otherwise simplifying, and communicating information about something that is 
of importance to decision-makers4.  Their use has arisen as mediating tools in 
inter-organisational (including inter-governmental) regulation. 
 
In this, indicators are not a new concept, but rather a vogue term for the 
formalised information used in tracking the performance of a system (Fitz-
Gibbon, 1990; LGMB, 1993).  An indicator relates to some quality, 
characteristic, or property (hereafter all referred to as attributes) of a system, 
ideally a central, rather than superficial or isolated attribute.  The presumption 
is that, to be useful, different values or states of an indicator must meaningfully 
represent different states or movements of system conditions such that the 
indicator can be used for monitoring and/or control purposes. 
 
Indicators may be quantitative (metric) or qualitative (nominal or descriptive), 
although the former is emphasised in much of the literature.  To date, much of 
the emphasis in agri-environmental systems has been upon quantitative, 
                                                 
4
  This poses an interesting question as to whether indicators are only distinguishable from 
other forms of information by their relevance to, and acceptance by, decision-makers.  i.e. 
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biophysical indicators.  Thus, for example, attention has focused upon the 
abundance of individual plant and animal species, or the usage of agro-
chemicals, or the area of certain land covers.  This raises data and 
methodological issues, but also some more fundamental conceptual issues. 
 
3.2  Data and Methodological Issues 
 
A full range of agri-environmental data is not collected routinely.  
Consequently, the data required to construct biophysical indicators are often 
unavailable: the poor quality, inaccessibility and irrelevance of existing 
datasets are more pervasive constraints to reliable indicator modelling than is 
commonly thought  (Bonnen, 1989; Magnuson, 1990; UN, 1996).  This 
problem is exacerbated in the UK by fragmented ownership of relevant data.  
That is, for example, datasets on soils, climate, topography, fertiliser usage, 
spatial land cover patterns, and species distributions are owned by a number of 
separate bodies such that collating extant data into a usable database for 
environmental indicator construction incurs high (and often repetitive) 
transaction costs.  Undertakings such as the Countryside Survey and the 
National Environmental Database represent belated attempts to rectify this 
problem. 
 
Decision-making problems exist at a variety of levels.  Given data constraints, 
this leads to the use of aggregation schemes to provide different indicators for 
different spatial, sectoral or temporal resolutions.  Such schemes are, however, 
prone to methodological errors which can generate misleading results.  For 
example, the ecological fallacy, the fallacies of composition and isolation, and 
the modifiable unit area problem (Robinson, 1950; Openshaw, 1984; Taylor 
                                                                                                                                                        
information is elevated to the status of an indicator by its users. 
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and Howitt, 1993; Steel and Holt, 1996).  Similarly, where decision-making 
problems involve more than one variable, for example the extent and quality of 
a habitat, weighting schemes are often employed to combine variables into a 
single indicator.  This is useful in that it reduces the volume of information that 
decision-makers have to contend with.  It is, however, also prone to 
methodological errors and, perhaps more importantly, can obscure important 
trends in the underlying data.  Aggregation and weighting issues thus represent 
a dilemma for indicator design: how to preserve the fine resolution detail 
required for guiding local level actions whilst avoiding information overload at 
the broader, global level.  The challenge is to simplify in order to clarify and to 
do so in a way that avoids losing any critical factors for analysis, or 
compromising the transparency of the chosen indicators. 
 
3.3  Conceptual Issues 
 
Although quantitative environmental indicators have their uses, they also have 
their limitations, especially for policy analysis which is their main justification.  
One of the key limitations is that such indicators express only what is 
quantifiable.  Some environmental characteristics are inherently more amenable 
than others to quantification.  Concentrations of pollutants, for example, can be 
measured with a reasonable degree of precision, while other characteristics, 
such as aesthetic beauty or tranquillity or the quality of land management, are 
recognised to defy objective measurement despite their importance (CPRE, 
1995).  Rather than difficult issues that should be set to one side, these matters 
are at the nub of the environmental critique of forms of economic development 
whose preoccupation with quantitative expressions of growth overrides 
considerations of the quality of life. 
 
  21 
Yet the emphasis on measurable outcomes leads to a pernicious form of issue 
redefinition and displacement that marginalises such matters.  For example, 
biodiversity indicators are proposed as surrogates for landscape quality even 
though the latter is not reducible to the former (there are many pleasing 
landscapes that are ecologically unexceptional and many visually unappealing 
mudflats that team with wildlife).  Reliance on quantitative indicators may thus 
lead to misrepresentation of the issues and the distortion of priorities.  The risk 
is that action will be concentrated where it will particularly influence the 
available indicators - a problem common to performance measures of any type.  
Alternatively, governments may be tempted to set objectives that are 
measurable but not particularly meaningful - for example, pesticide reduction 
programmes expressed in terms of the overall mass of active ingredients rather 
than the environmental risks they pose. 
 
Information is most often sought to explain why important conditions are 
changing over time or to interpret the effect of particular governmental or 
societal actions on the environment.  Unfortunately, another shortcoming of 
indicators is that causation cannot necessarily be inferred from a correlation 
between the behaviour of particular indicators  - that would necessitate detailed 
investigation.  Indicators reveal trends, they do not explain them. 
 
Another difficulty lies in developing indicators specifically for sustainable 
development. This necessitates going beyond simple measures of 
environmental protection or degradation to indicators that explicitly link 
impacts with socio-economic activity.  However, such linkages are rarely 
straightforward and great caution or insight is required in interpreting them.  
The shift in emphasis towards sustainable development should highlight 
processes and institutional structures rather than specific environmental 
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outcomes: the task being to establish sustainable systems rather than to achieve 
some environmental end-state. 
 
A final shortcoming of quantitative indicators relates to the problem of time.  
The significance of most environmental indicators is what they reveal in the 
medium to long-term, typically over several years, if not decades, and they are 
usually tracked on an annual basis or longer.  Short-term fluctuations - say in 
wildlife populations or nutrient balances - may not be significant and may 
simply be due to variable weather conditions, for example.  The effects of 
government policies and other societal interventions on the environment 
usually also have a long time lag.  The consequence is that current trends are 
unlikely to be a reliable indication of the performance of current policies.  
Indicators may therefore be a guide to problems that need to be addressed but 
are of little help in assessing the policy response.  The claim that indicators 
"can help to measure the extent to which policies aimed at sustainable 
development objectives are being achieved" (DoE, 1996, p.2) is therefore, 
something of a hollow one. 
 
Underlying these specific shortcomings is a flawed analogy with economic 
statistics.  The notion that the use of environmental indicators should mirror the 
role of economic indicators in the transactions of government implies that the 
issue is essentially one of management, of minor adjustments to the pace or 
direction of development - just as signs of an upward trend in inflation or 
unemployment might call for a slight tightening of monetary policy or a 
slackening of fiscal policy.  But it is naive to imply that the only reason policies 
and practices in the past were unsustainable was because of lack of refined 
information concerning the consequences.  More typically, it was because these 
past policies and practices were conceptually flawed in ignoring the 
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environment as a factor in their models of action and intervention.  The shift to 
a sustainable trajectory must therefore involve the redesign of policies, 
institutions and structures.  To do this purposively calls for causal knowledge, 
not just trend knowledge of processes.  And that necessarily entails 
disaggregated, sector-specific conceptual models, not the sort of aggregated 
societal thinking that lies behind the OECD's indicator framework (with its 
echoes of macroeconomic models and its search for 'core' indicators). 
 
3.4  Indicator Strategies 
 
The apparent emphasis upon quantitative, biophysical indicators reflects a 'top-
down, managerialist' or 'technocratic' approach to agri-environmental systems.  
This is epitomised by the OECD's Pressure-State-Response (PSR) framework 
and the closely related Driving-Force-State-Response (DSR) model, both of 
which are derived from an earlier 'stress-response' model used in a more limited 
ecological context (Friends and Rapport, 1979).  These assume linear causality 
within a rigid system, neglecting the possibility for structural elements of the 
system to change. 
 
Yet agri-environmental systems are complex, heterogeneous entities which 
encompass both biophysical and socio-economic elements.  The macro and 
managerialist perspective imposed by the technocratic approach obscures the 
social and political forces at work.  Thus, on the one hand, in conceiving the 
relation between agriculture and the rural environment in terms of technical 
adjustments to an economic sector (rather than the reorientation of a social and 
occupational community), the OECD-type indicator framework perpetuates a 
policy outlook which, by abstracting farming from its social and environmental 
context, is part of the fundamental problem.  On the other hand, in seeking to 
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construct an objective, politically neutral indicator framework, the OECD 
approach deliberately obfuscates the political conflicts involved, in the 
outcome of which national governments and powerful sectional groups have 
strong vested interests.  The consequence is a failure to acknowledge that 
effective integration of agricultural and environmental objectives must imply 
changed social relationships and institutional structures. 
 
In portraying the policy process as one of rational decision-making, the 
technocratic approach presents indicators as standardised and universalistic 
norms, that are scientifically defined and allow for the evaluation and 
adjustment of policy interventions.  For example  “The work carried out by the 
OECD focuses on sets of indicators to be used for the integration of 
environmental and economic decision-making, at national and international 
level.  These indicators can also be valuable in communicating with the public”  
(OECD, 1991, p 8). 
 
An alternative, 'popular/radical' approach starts from the assumption that the 
integration of environmental objectives into any sector must involve changed 
social relationships and institutional structures.  Indicators therefore are seen as 
means of raising the profile of problems or issues.  Emphasis is placed on 
evidence or incidents that are open to popular judgement which allow for 
problem definition to be prised away from the grasp of closed policy 
communities and expert judgement.  Within this approach, sustainability 
indicators are seen not as a complement but as a challenge to established 
economic indicators, opening up a critical debate about the conventional 
objectives and measurement of societal progress.  In the UK, the Local 
Government Management Board, since 1993, has had a programme to develop 
sustainability indicators that will promote public communication and 
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participation along these lines.  Rather than focusing on biophysical indicators, 
an alternative is to focus upon the outlook and behaviour of socio-economic 
agents by using attitudinal and institutional indicators. 
 
3.5  Attitudinal and Institutional Indicators 
 
In general, the regulatory framework will channel the course of agricultural 
development in so far as it modifies present agricultural practices and induces 
technical change on the farm.  This relationship between regulation, technical 
change and farm adjustment may be conceived as one of ‘structural learning’.  
Structural learning (see Argyris and Schon, 1978) focuses on changes to the 
cognitive or normative propositions held by individual or collective actors.  
From this perspective, the process of moving towards a more sustainable 
agriculture will be marked as much by changes in the interpretative frames of 
agricultural actors (i.e. developments in their understanding) and related 
institutional developments (that reflect the new connections and relationships 
being forged) as it will be by the achievement of more commonly discussed and 
measurable outcomes, such as reduction in pollution and increases in 
biodiversity.  Yet the focus on environmental outcomes, which is reinforced by 
the preoccupation with quantitative indicators, may lead to a disregard of the 
lessons being learnt from regulatory policy by target groups and the need for 
wider institutional reforms.  It is unclear, for example, whether current 
regulations are helping to catalyse structural learning in the direction of a more 
sustainable agriculture or acting to fortify incompatible behaviours and 
attitudes.  While it is possible to gather evidence to make judgements on 
precisely these matters, it is also the case that the full environmental 
consequences of the recent measures taken to counter the adverse effects of 
contemporary agriculture will not become clear for several years to come.  
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Attitudinal and institutional indicators thus allow us to judge in the mean time 
whether policy is set in an appropriate direction. 
 
In this sense, appropriate attitudinal and institutional developments may be 
seen as a means  (i.e. part of the process) of achieving desired environmental 
outcomes.  But such developments may also be seen as desired ends in 
themselves.  Indeed it may be argued that the ultimate outcome is to establish 
sustainable systems with a capacity, at the individual and institutional levels, 
for self-monitoring.  Any specification of environmental outcomes in contrast, 
must be recognised as necessarily provisional and subject to revision as a result 
of improved scientific understanding, debate over social priorities and the 
changing state of the environment. 
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4. EVALUATING OUTPUT AND OUTCOME 
 INDICATORS IN USE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Three phases in the development of policies, the processes, their output and 
their final outcomes, may usefully be recognised.  This chapter introduces the 
crucial distinction between policy outputs and policy outcomes as a possible 
basis for indicators.  It establishes the distinction first in principle and then 
moves on to illustrate its significance.  Output and outcome indicators are 
firstly illustrated and assessed with reference to the DoE (1996)  Indicators for 
Sustainable Development for the UK and then by reference to two agri-
environmental programmes policies - Environmentally Sensitive Areas and 
Countryside Stewardship.  We then turn to the question of policy process and 
show at the end of Section 4 what it may offer as an alternative basis for 
constructing indicators. 
 
The objectives of agri-environmental policies are to produce desired policy 
outcomes, often specified in detail for particular sites or types of ecosystem.  
These outcomes may consist of natural capital which requires a long time to 
produce.  However, the exigencies of the policy scene are such that policies 
have to be ‘justified’ even as they are introduced and certainly well before there 
has been any significant pay-off from them.  In these circumstances policy-
makers understandably fall back on justifying their activities in terms of policy 
outputs i.e. measures of the extent to which the policy is being applied or taken 
up.  For example the number of, and area covered by, management agreements 
under agri-environmental contracts is a measure of the support for a policy 
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from participants.  They are indicators of the ‘roll-out’ of a policy but do not 
necessarily say anything about the outcomes of the intervention. 
 
There is at present a substantial fashion for using indicators to reflect the 
outcome of environmental policies of all kinds but the discussion of the 
previous sections has shown the weakness of such procedures.  In essence the 
generation of indicators requires reduction of complex multi-dimensional and 
often dynamic processes to the time path of one or two particular chosen 
variables.  Whilst the attractions of this cannot be denied, its shortcomings are 
formidable and would call for extreme caution in the use of such measures.  
Nevertheless, it is accepted that output and outcome measures will be used as 
environmental indicators.  
 
In the remainder of this section we therefore raise the focus of the argument to 
consider the ultimate goals of agri-environmental policy and then return to 
consider how its progress towards these goals is monitored.  Thus we consider 
in this section the indications from outcomes versus those from outputs, before 
turning to Section 5 in which we offer a radical alternative type of indicator, 
based on process. 
 
4.2 Outcomes vs. Outputs 
 
The need for agri-environmental indicators arises, at least partially, because the 
desired state of the environment sought by policy makers may not be directly 
observable.  That is, the desired, real, physical outcomes of agri-environmental 
policies may lie in the future (e.g. long-term habitat regeneration) or may 
simply be difficult to measure, at least without extensive monitoring activities 
(e.g. abundance of a species).  Consequently, some proxy measure is required 
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to indicate progress towards the desired outcome.  One possibility is to use 
more readily observable outputs.  That is, rather than attempting to measure 
outcomes directly, an observable impact of a policy is taken as an indicator.  
This approach is already reflected in some of the items proposed by the 
Department of the Environment's 'Indicators of Sustainable Development for 
the United Kingdom' (DoE, 1996).  For example, section 's: Land cover and 
landscape' encompasses the following: 
 
s1 Rural land cover 
s2 Designated and protected areas 
s3 Damage to designated and protected areas 
s4 Agricultural productivity 
s5 Nitrogen usage 
s6 Pesticide usage 
s7 Length of landscape linear features 
s8 Environmentally managed land 
 
Broadly, indicators s1, s2, and s8 are outputs.  That is, the area of rural land 
types, designated areas and environmentally managed land are all relatively 
easily observed variables that respond to policy signals and can be used to 
comment (albeit crudely) upon the suitability of land for delivering 
environmental outcomes, especially when considered in conjunction with s3, 
s4, s5 and s6 which provide information on the manner in which the area is 
managed.  Indicator s7 demonstrates that outputs and outcomes may coincide.  
That is, increasing the length of landscape linear features may be a desirable 
outcome in its own right, perhaps for aesthetic landscape reasons,  but it may 
also be taken as an output indicator of habitat stock. 
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The inferential leap that is required to link output indicators to desired 
outcomes leads some commentators to focus exclusively upon outcomes.  For 
example, the 'Biodiversity Challenge' (e.g. Wynne et al, 1995) suggests that the 
focus should be upon what needs to be achieved in terms of particular species 
and particular habitats.  This leads to contemplation of a lengthy list of example 
species and habitats, together with quantified target objectives couched in 
terms of the number or distribution of a species or the extent and quality of a 
habitat.  The sheer volume of individual items involved, however, points to 
widespread monitoring efforts that may prove too demanding.  As a 
compromise, it is possible to consider the use of key outcomes as indicators of 
wider and/or more detailed outcomes.  Thus, for example, the DoE also suggest 
a range of outcome indicators in section 'r: Wildlife and habitats':  
 
r1 Native species at risk 
r2 Breeding birds 
r3 Plant diversity in semi-improved grassland 
r4 Area of chalk grassland 
r5 Plant diversity in hedgerows 
r6 Habitat fragmentation 
r7 Lakes and Ponds 
r8 Plant diversity in stream sides 
r9 Mammal populations 
r10 Dragonfly distributions 
r11 Butterfly distributions 
 
Here, most of the suggested indicators are outcomes in their own right, but are 
used to indicate underlying environmental states. 
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4.3 Environmental Indicators in Agri-Environment Schemes 
 
4.3.1 ESAs:  Outputs and Outcomes 
 
ESA schemes have been the subject of much official scrutiny, having just 
emerged from examinations by the Agriculture Committee (1997), the National 
Audit Office (1997) and the Public Accounts Committee (1998).  Several 
criticisms have been made and the Government response to the Agriculture 
Committee (Minister of Agriculture, 1997) was generally positive. 
 
The type of crude output indicator used to reflect early ‘progress’ in the 
establishment of ESAs is presented in Table 2.  Such data pervades the 
literature on ESAs where it is often left to ‘speak for itself’, implying that it is a 
useful indicator. 
 
 
 
Table 2   Environmentally Sensitive Areas: Annual and      
 Total Area and Number of Agreements: England 
 
  
1992-3 
 
1993-4 
 
1994-5 
 
1995-6   
 
Total 
England      
Area under Agreement 129,358 137,100 79,933 63,571 409,062 
Number of Agreements 3,265 1,249 1,627 1,322 7,463 
   Source: Agriculture Committee, 1997 
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In addition to external scrutiny, MAFF has conducted its own monitoring 
programme and this has produced a series of monitoring studies of individual 
ESAs which have been published.  Each ESA is monitored on a five yearly 
cycle and the first ESAs have therefore now had two rounds of monitoring. The 
Pennine Dales two monitoring reports (MAFF 1992, 1996) will be taken as an 
example of the type of information made available through these studies. 
 
The first monitoring report (MAFF, 1992) on the Pennine Dales ESA (PDESA) 
relates to surveys that gathered information over the period 1987 to 1990.  It 
records brief details of the management prescription and notes that the number 
of agreements operative had reached 290, covering 73% of the eligible area by 
1990.  The monitoring surveys were divided into four separate sub-programmes 
covering landscape elements, biological features, historic features and 
landscape quality.  Each of these receives separate treatment in the report. 
 
The landscape elements were surveyed using an aerial survey and the material 
was analysed in terms of land cover change and linear and point features from 
1987 to 1990, comparing agreement land and non-agreement land.  Not 
surprisingly the changes recorded in this short period are rather small.  For 
example, the report describes linear feature change as in Table 3. 
 
  33 
Table 3 Linear Feature Change 1987 - 1990, PDESA. 
 
Linear Feature Class Net Change in Length (%)  
1987 - 1990 
 Agreement  
Land 
Non-
agreement  
Land 
Continuous Walls +1.0 +0.1 
Discontinuous Walls -1.4 +0.5 
Continuous Hedges -3.6 -10.0 
Discontinuous Hedges +1.9 -0.2 
Continuous Walls with Hedges -4.8 -2.7 
Discontinuous Walls with Hedges -2.4 -0.5 
Source:  MAFF, 1991 
 
Clearly such material would be difficult to turn into an indicator of any kind 
especially if it had to reflect the changes in such a complex area as the 16,000 
hectares of upland valley bottom of the PDESA.  In fact this form of analysis 
loses a great deal of information from the original data by analysing down to the 
level of single net changes for the whole group of farms in a substantial but 
discontinuous area.  The full data would have revealed substantial differences 
between farms with many recording much larger changes, in either direction, in 
the variables reported.   
 
Some of that variability may be retained by using the ‘matrix of change’ form of 
presentation, as this report did for the land use change in the ESA.  That 
presentation is much richer, recording movements into and out of each category 
of land type cover in the ESA - this variability is a vital feature of assessing 
environmental change.  Clearly it is difficult to produce any comparable 
measure of change from the result that 64.2 hectares moved between categories 
in an ESA of the 16,000 hectares of the ESA.  The matrix format is potentially 
interesting in that it presents much more information than the simple tabulation 
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of row and column totals, but only a minute amount of change was found over 
this rather short period in the whole ESA. 
 
The second monitoring report on the PDESA (MAFF, 1996) covers 1987 - 
1995.  However, in the middle of that period the ESA was trebled in size thus 
leaving those conducting the survey with the dilemma as to whether they should 
try to analyse change separately in the old and the new ESA areas, thus making 
full use of the opportunity to examine some changes resulting from the policy 
over nearly a decade, or to examine all changes within the ESA together and 
ignore the fact that some of the results relate to a short period and some to a 
longer one.  In fact they chose the latter position, thus losing any chance of 
measuring change over a single period for all parts of the ESA. 
 
The objectives of the ESA are listed in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1   Objectives of the Pennine Dales ESA 
 
♦ To maintain and enhance the wildlife conservation value of hay meadows; 
  
♦ To maintain the wildlife conservation value of pasture land; 
  
♦ To maintain the wildlife conservation value of rough grazing without 
detriment to the landscape; 
  
♦ To maintain and enhance landscape quality through management of 
characteristic landscape elements; 
  
♦ To maintain and enhance archaeological and historic features. 
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In an appendix the PDESA report also lists a series of objectives and 
performance indicators covering uptake targets (for example 80% of pasture is 
under Tier I agreement), targets relating only to agreement land (for example 
10% of non-stock-proofed walls are renovated under conservation plans) and 
environmental impact indicators (for example, vegetation that is characteristic 
of hay meadows increases on land under Tier 2 agreement).  In all 19 indicators 
are listed. 
 
In contrast with the previous PDESA report it does not present a matrix of land 
use cover change but it does record the change in total area of ‘key land cover 
classes’ between designation and 1995 although this is clearly difficult to 
interpret in the light of the change in the designated area.  The presentation 
records the total area in each class and the net change in the size of that class 
over the (varying) period.  It records that whilst 74 hectares were lost from key 
classes, 75 hectares were gained.  This information is of little use unless the 
positive or negative significance of each change is recorded with it.  The fact 
that the changes detected are so small suggests that the major increase in the 
ESA has dwarfed the appearance of possible changes within each land use cover 
type. 
 
4.3.2 Countryside Stewardship: Schemes 
 
Although a much newer policy than ESAs, Stewardship has nevertheless 
secured a substantial number of farmer contracts and, partly because of its 
flexibility and its capacity to target particular features, it is seen as a highly 
successful policy.  It has also been the subject of a number of appraisals 
(summarised in Tucker and Rebane, 1997).  The objectives of Stewardship have 
been subject to adjustment as the policy has developed and are summarised in 
Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 Final Objectives of Countryside Stewardship 
 
♦ sustain the beauty and diversity of the landscape; 
♦ improve and extend wildlife habitats; 
♦ conserve archaeological sites and historic features; 
♦ improve opportunities for enjoying the countryside; 
♦ restore neglected land or landscape features; 
♦ create new wildlife habitats and landscapes. 
 
Source:  Rebane and Tucker, 1997 
 
Figure 3 Basic Countryside Stewardship Constraints 
 
♦ management of grazing to avoid damage by overgrazing or 
poaching; 
♦ no disturbance of land by ploughing or other cultivation unless 
specified in the agreement; 
♦ no application of organic or inorganic fertilisers, lime or slag; 
♦ any essential rolling or chain-harrowing should  avoid disturbance to 
birds; 
♦ limitation of herbicide and pesticides to the use of weed wiper or 
spot treatment for the control of spear thistle, creeping or field 
thistle, curled dock, broad-leaved dock, ragwort and, with prior 
agreement, nettles; 
♦ no modification or installation of new drainage systems unless 
specified in the agreement; 
♦ no supplementary feeding unless agreed in advance; 
♦ protection of other areas and features of conservation value on the 
holding including:  hedgerows and traditional walls; trees, copses 
and woodlands; historic and archaeological features; geological 
features and wetlands, ponds, osiers and withies; 
♦ fulfilment of all legal obligations to ensure all public rights of way 
are unobstructed; 
♦ maintenance of any existing informal public access on or to 
agreement land. 
Source:  Rebane and Tucker, 1997 
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The basic constraints which Stewardship applies through most of its contracts 
are summarised in Figure 3.  This complex of requirements provides a basis for 
assessing performance on stewardship areas.  It is augmented with further 
detailed requirements for individual landscape types and the contracts with 
farmers contain specifically negotiated details of the individualised farm 
management package of elements agreed. 
 
4.3.3 Countryside Stewardship: Outputs and Outcomes 
 
Rebane and Tucker also review amounts of land attracted into each landscape 
type relative to national stocks of each type.  The shares of national stock 
attracted range from 10% to 25%.  An overall assessment of scheme output is 
based on how many of the four possible types of benefit were produced by 
individual agreements.  The four types were landscape, wildlife, history and 
access benefits and the result for a sample of 117 sites is summarised in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 Distribution of CS Schemes by Benefit Categories 
 
Number of Types of Benefit Number of sites % of sites 
4 21 18.0 
3 47 40.0 
2 35 30.0 
1 3 2.6 
0 11 9.4 
All sites 117 100.0 
Source:  derived from Rebane and Tucker, 1997, Table 6.1. 
 
Environmental benefits were assessed on the basis of two elements, first, the 
direction of change and second, the environmental and historical value of the 
site.  These two elements were combined into criteria summarised in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 Combined Criteria for Assessing Site Stewardship  
 Performance 
 
♦ sites that showed positive changes in environmental value at the time 
of the repeat visit. 
♦ sites....judged likely to show positive changes in the future, though 
these were not detected at the time of the repeat visit, due to the short 
interval between visits and the long term nature of anticipated 
benefits. 
♦ sites that were of high environmental value, where this value had been 
maintained under CS (....) or where there had been a decline in value 
wholly unrelated to the scheme(....). 
♦ sites of low or moderate value for history / archaeology where there 
was no opportunity for CS to improve its value. 
Source:  Rebane and Tucker, 1997 
 
The report acknowledges the evident need for judgement in applying these 
criteria.  It also finds that the substantial majority of sites met scheme landscape 
and wildlife objectives (74% and 78%, respectively).  Similar results were found 
for archaeological and historic sites. 
 
The study also assesses the extent to which site visitors had noticed change 
resulting from the agreements.  Considering twelve specific improvements, an 
impressive 80% to 94% of visitors had not noticed the change.  Of the changes 
that were noticed most were thought to have increased the attractions of the site, 
the exception to that being tree felling, which usually provoked a negative 
initial response. 
 
The monitoring results were also set against a ‘control’ group of 21 sites on 
which a similar assessment had been made.  It was concluded that a much 
higher proportion of Stewardship sites had achieved improvements than control 
sites, demonstrating additionality of the benefits achieved.   
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4.4 Agri-environment Indicator Options 
 
The above discussion of the conditions and requirements of these two forms of 
management agreement are summarised in Figure 5.  In much of the literature 
on evaluation of agri-environmental policies, the starting point for evaluation is 
the number of agreements made and the area they cover.  They are used, in the 
absence of alternatives, to indicate the scale of policy, but they rarely tell us 
more.  Expenditure data are also often quoted, but they are as potentially 
misleading as agreement numbers and areas in that they may simply indicate the 
generosity of payment levels.  Such data provide no indication of policy success 
in any long-term sense and merely reflect the need to clutch at whatever straws 
of information can be found.  With the caveats above, we may then examine the 
possible indicators of success for these policies. 
 
Countryside Stewardship is the newest of the two policy instruments considered 
here and, having been recently taken under MAFF management it is perhaps in a 
more dynamic stage of development.  Stewardship differs from ESAs in that it 
does not require designation of specific areas - merely the specification of 
eligible types of landscape.  This allows some flexibility in its application and 
gives some scope for negotiated flexibility in the way it is used.  It thus provides 
the obvious agri-environmental policy instrument for ‘filling in’ the areas 
between the more formally designated areas. 
 
Interestingly, its flexibility may mitigate against the use of indicators for 
monitoring the performance of Stewardship.  Insofar as flexibility is used to 
extend the instrument’s application, it becomes more difficult to specify which 
indicators are to be used for monitoring its effectiveness. 
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Figure 5  Managerial Structure: ESAs and Countryside   
 Stewardship 
 
             Instrument ⇒ 
Characteristic ⇓ 
ESA Countryside Stewardship 
Duration of 
Designation 
Perpetual. No designation: eligible 
landscapes defined. 
Objectives To encourage farmers to conserve 
areas of countryside where the 
landscape, wildlife or historic 
interest is of national importance.  
ESA objectives separately 
specified. 
Landscape, wildlife, 
archaeological 
conservation.  Improve 
enjoyment, restore and re-
create landscapes and 
habitats. 
Requirements for 
agreement 
Undertaking to comply with 
guidelines. 
No compulsion to make 
contracts. 
Individually negotiated 
elements from a pre-
defined menu.  No 
compulsion to make 
contracts. 
Opportunities May offer compliance with 
elements of management 
package. 
Choice of items for 
inclusion. 
Negotiation Mostly predetermined: details 
only. 
Package of items agreed, 
each farm. 
Monitoring 
Site level 
Farm level 
 
Informal. 
Was one year in 5, now one in 
20. 
Each year under 
Countryside Commission.  
Now less frequent under 
MAFF. 
Sanctions Policy is to reclaim payments 
made.  EU Regulation offers 
stronger possibilities 
Under MAFF, agreements 
may be terminated and 
payments reclaimed. 
End of Agreement No requirement to renegotiate : 
owner may do as he pleases. 
No requirement to 
renegotiate: owner may do 
as he pleases, except MAFF 
now requires farmers who 
have restored walling to 
maintain it for a further ten 
years. 
Source:  Agriculture Committee, 1997. 
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For ESAs, output indicators would have to be in terms of uptake of agreements, 
participation in different Tiers of management and so on.  Because there is no 
legal requirement for any form of participation, ‘success’ can only be measured 
in terms of pre-set standard levels of compliance.  Even that has to be based on 
the assumption that uptake is not influenced by variously-generous rates of 
compensation.  Such an assumption would be difficult to justify in the light of 
the NAO (1997) claim that levels of compensation are over-generous for many 
farmers but do not sufficiently compensate others for the prescriptions they must 
follow.  Proceeding on that basis, nevertheless, it would be possible to design 
indicators.  For example, objective 3 on the Somerset Levels and Moors ESA 
demands the maintenance and enhancement of landscape quality through 
management of characteristic landscape elements, as shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 Targets for Attainment of Objective 3, Somerset  
 Levels and Moors ESA 
 
♦ there is no reduction in the total length of rhynes; 
♦ there is no loss of pollarded willows; 
♦ per cent of agreements have a conservation plan; 
♦ per cent of conservation plans include provision for introducing an 
appropriate management cycle for non-pollarded willows; 
♦ per cent of conservation plans include provision for the re-instatement of 
abandoned rhynes. 
Source:  MAFF, 1997 
 
Clearly progress towards such objectives can be measured in quantitative terms 
and it would be possible to ‘score’ the extent of achievement of each of them in 
terms of the list.  But how would such measures then be combined?  It is 
unlikely that each of these elements is equally important so weights would be 
needed to aggregate this material.  Similar treatment would be needed for the 
other three objectives of this ESA, which resolve into twelve sub-objectives. 
 42 
From the comparison of ESAs and Stewardship we conclude that data on uptake 
of contracts by farm and area may be an indicator of the extent to which farmers 
are likely to undertake environmentally friendly activities.  But they may also 
indicate a calculated gamble on the part of farmers that the level of payment is 
high enough to make it worth signing the contract in the expectation that 
monitoring of its outcome will be sufficiently lax to prevent retribution if 
contract details are ignored:  there are items in the standard contracts currently 
in use which are either very difficult or may be impossible to monitor for 
compliance.  Even where contracts are fully and honestly complied with it is 
possible that the desired outcome will not appear until well after the end of the 
contract, if at all.  It might be prevented from appearing by adverse weather 
conditions in particular years or it may fail to materialise for other reasons 
unknown at the time the contract was entered into.  After the end of the contract 
the farmer is usually free to revert to pre-contract behaviour which may well 
destroy whatever environmental capital has been produced during the contract.  
Legally this is difficult to prevent. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
The above discussion of outputs and outcomes shows that, in the case of both 
the DoE’s Indicators for Sustainable Development and the two main agri-
environment policy instruments applied in the UK, there is an inevitable 
tendency to concentrate on crude measures of the more obvious policy outputs.  
This can be seen particularly in the use of management contracts where policy 
success is too readily inferred from the number of contracts negotiated and the 
area covered by them.  Policy outcomes generally receive less emphasis, 
essentially because there are fewer tangible outcomes to be identified at this 
stage.   
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Although outcomes may be the legitimate focus of policy efforts, and outputs 
may offer an apparently convenient means of inferring progress towards 
outcomes; a third type of indicator, based on policy processes, should also be 
considered.  Process indicators may reflect the potential achievement of 
outcomes through the implementation of policies.  Implementation requires 
processes: policy makers, institutions and private agents must all behave in a 
manner conducive to delivering outcomes. 
 
Institutional and attitudinal indicators will reflect these earlier manifestations of 
the policy process and will therefore avoid the problem of timing referred to 
above.  Moreover they offer a rich complex of evidence of the extent to which 
necessary conditions for policy success are in place.  It will be comparatively 
rare for such indicators to be measured quantitatively - for example that might 
require detailed surveys of changing farmers’ attitudes to the environment.  
There may be a more or less widespread conviction amongst the research 
community that such attitudes have changed in the last decade but there are no 
repeated surveys from which changes might be deduced.  This applies even 
more to officials dealing with agricultural policies of all kinds.  Yet change in 
these attitudes offers a stronger prospect of sustainable environmental 
management than the simple measures of output from agri-environmental 
policies discussed above. 
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5. PROCESS INDICATORS: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH?  
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
Reflecting on the two types of indicator described above it can be seen that each 
has strengths and weaknesses. Output indicators are perhaps the less useful, 
dimly reflecting only the intermediate steps towards the potential gaining of 
desired outcomes.  Outcome indicators are, in a sense, the more hopeful option 
but there will be serious lags before they will reflect desirable outcomes.  Given 
the deficiencies of these potential measures of policy performance we now turn 
to consider the  introduction of attitudinal and institutional monitoring as an 
alternative. Such process indicators are available as the policy is developed, thus 
avoiding the ‘wait for benefits’ and the ‘end of contract problem’. 
 
In the rest of this report we draw attention to the rich potential for a more 
endogenous process of policy monitoring through examination of the policy 
process as it develops.  This would call for the generation and use of attitudinal 
and social indicators in monitoring the policy process, arguing that adequately 
functioning institutions are also a necessary condition for policy success and 
that the time-lags while awaiting outcomes are sufficient to make attitudinal and 
institutional indicators a vital ingredient in policy appraisal. 
 
Derivation of indicators for the two agri-environmental policy instruments 
discussed above will have to cope with a number of conditions revealed in the 
previous section.  First, and perhaps of particular present importance, all of the 
policies have shown a strong propensity to change over the last few years.  
ESAs have been subject to revisions of payment levels, introduction of new tiers 
and extensions of designated boundaries whilst Countryside Stewardship has 
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been evolving during its first few years and new options have been added in and 
other rules adjusted.   
 
Second, the environment in which farmers take decisions has also been shifting 
during the last few years under the influence of major agricultural policy 
changes (Arable Area Payments, Livestock Payment Quotas) to say nothing of 
the dramatic shifts in the world trade situation and catastrophes such as BSE.  It 
is perhaps remarkable that extremes of weather have not seriously disturbed the 
attempt to get agri-environmental policies into place in the last few years: they 
could certainly have interrupted trends judged relevant to monitoring. 
 
Third, the policies under discussion are sufficiently recent that it is not to be 
expected that many of the benefits from them will yet be evident.  This is partly 
a consequence of the pace of ecological change but also reflects the capital 
nature of some of the activities expected of farmers through these policies.   
 
These three factors substantially limit the strength of inferences that can be 
drawn from the conventional monitoring activities of agri-environmental 
policies undertaken.  The factors therefore further encourage the use of process-
based indicators, such as attitudinal and environmental indicators, which offer a 
much stronger probability of effective monitoring. 
 
5.2 Attitudinal and Institutional Monitoring 
 
If we therefore accept that the present output-dominated approach to 
environmental monitoring is not going to produce what is needed, we are then 
driven to search for alternatives.  The main alternatives come from the 
realisation that technological paradigms, of the kind experienced in agriculture 
during the last half-century, depend upon the establishment and maintenance of 
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local social and institutional networks.  Such networks link extension 
institutions, manufacturers, suppliers, advisors and producers: in large degree 
they are held together by the regulatory framework.  The relationship between 
this network and farm adjustment is conceived as one of ‘structural learning’ 
(Argyris and Schon, 1978) which focuses on changes to the cognitive or 
normative information held by individuals or collective actors.  In such a model 
learning is equated with the change of interpretive frames held by actors rather 
than by the achievement of specific tasks.  This shifts the correct target for 
monitoring effective change from events to the extent of learning processes;  
genuine change will be reflected in new attitudes and approaches. 
 
This approach would suggest that monitoring agri-environmental policies could 
usefully be based upon the extent to which farmers have genuinely taken 
environmental attitudes ‘on board’ as a result of policies.  This in turn might be 
further supported by evidence of training of farmers in agri-environmental 
management, as provided for in Regulation 2078/92.  To be effective, learning 
programmes have to give weight to structural learning (the why? Of 
conservation) as well as content learning (the how? Of conservation). 
 
5.3 Attitudinal and Institutional Indicators 
 
To analyse the response of agriculture in a way that centrally addresses the 
social and political dimensions of integration, we can usefully distinguish the 
following levels: the individual farmer; the regulation of farming (i.e. the 
pattern of incentives and controls acting on farmers); and policy making for 
agriculture.  Below, for each of these levels, we consider in turn the sorts of 
indicators that would reveal significant adaptive responses integrating 
environmental objectives. 
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5.3.1 Integration of Environmental Objectives into Farmers’ Attitudes 
 
Agricultural policy reforms in general and agri-environment measures in 
particular should enhance farmers’ attitudes towards the environment and clarify 
their understanding of their environmental responsibilities.  It might reasonably 
be expected that there would already be discernible changes in farmers attitudes, 
and even in farming cultures, from participation in agri-environment schemes, 
even where the environmental consequence could still not be gauged.  Previous 
research (see, for example, Potter and Gasson, 1988) suggests that the attitude 
of farmers entering agreements is a critical determinant of the level and quality 
of any environmental benefits obtained.  Colman et al (1992) have argued that 
“policy measures which encourage positive attitudes to conservation will in the 
long term be more effective than those that do not, since a positive shift in 
attitudes will increase the output of conservation goods at any specified level of 
budgetary cost”.  Indeed it could be argued that unless they exert such an 
influence, agri-environmental schemes will inevitably be seen as temporary 
bribes, shallow in operation and transitory in their effect (Morris and Potter, 
1995).   
 
Recording changes in the attitude and outlook of farmers participating in agri-
environmental schemes may be used as an indicator of farm-level structural 
learning. Unfortunately, no research has yet investigated the extent to which 
environmental attitudes evolve during the course of a management agreement.  
Work already conducted in the UK, however, has analysed the motives of 
farmers entering agreements and has sought to measure any differences in 
outlook and situation compared to non-participants (Morris and Potter, 1995). 
This more behavioural approach has provided some clues about the depth of 
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commitment to and engagement with programme objectives, and the likelihood 
that conservation activity will be sustained in the long term.   
 
Farmers can be placed on a ‘participation spectrum’, ranging from the most 
resistant non-adopters through to ‘compliers’ (farmers who conform to the terms 
of management agreements in order to receive the payment), and concluding 
with a small number of self-selecting ‘stewards’ (farmers who evince a strong 
conservationist mind set).  There is little evidence of any movement between 
these categories as a result of initial participation in schemes.  Comparative 
research in the UK, Netherlands, Germany, France and Spain (Lobley and 
Potter, 1998) suggests that the bulk of current participants in most agri-
environmental schemes within the EU are effectively ‘compliers’ on this 
definition, joining schemes because of the goodness of fit between scheme 
design and their existing farming system.  Stewards are very definitely in the 
minority, their participation typically being a continuation of a long trajectory of 
environmental management on the farms concerned. 
 
In additionality terms, policy makers would seem to be caught in a double bind.  
On the one hand, scheme conditions need to be sufficiently undemanding to 
attract enough farmers into schemes to make a recognisable impact.  This may 
be environmentally useful, to the extent that existing features and habitat 
mosaics are maintained, but genuinely additional effects are likely to be difficult 
to prove empirically.  It also encourages compliance behaviour on the part of 
farmers which can easily be abandoned once contracts expire.  On the other 
hand, more restrictive (usually upper tier) agreements, necessary to engineer 
more substantial changes in land use and the restoration of landscapes and 
habitats, appear to be appealing to a much smaller, self-selecting band of 
farmers.  Because many of these would have done what they are doing without 
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subsidy, through force of circumstance or conviction, it is a moot point whether 
they are generating more additionality than the compliant majority. However, 
being much more genuinely engaged with the environmental objectives of 
schemes, the endorsement of the values of these participants and any additions 
to their ranks must be counted as achievements in the long-term objective of 
moving towards a sustainable agriculture. 
 
Training of farmers may be crucial if attitudes are to change more widely.  
Without appropriate training, the impact of schemes on farmers’ attitudes and 
behaviour may be shallow and temporary.  Participation in agri-environmental 
training programmes is therefore likely to be a better indicator of progress than 
participation in agri-environmental schemes.  It is important that training 
programmes pay as much attention to structural learning as to content learning 
(i.e. the why and not just the how of conservation).  This points to the 
opportunity missed in the UK implementation of EU Regulation 2078/92, under 
Article 6 of which member states “may introduce a separate aid scheme for 
training courses and traineeships concerned with agricultural and forestry 
production practices compatible with the requirements and protection of the 
environment and natural resources and maintenance of the landscape, and 
particularly with codes of good farming practice or good organic farming 
practice.” 
 
5.3.2 Integration of Environmental Objectives into the Regulation of Farm 
Management 
 
To achieve sustainability involves not only the encouragement of 
environmentally sensitive attitudes and practices, but also the assumption by the 
farmer of the role of the environmental manager.  The progress of integrating 
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environmental objectives into the regulation of farming should be judged in 
terms of the extent to which it casts farmers in this role.  Of central importance 
is a change in the relationship between technological change and farming 
practice.  Post-war agricultural policy adhered to a model of agricultural 
innovation in which the dynamic of technological advance was seen to lie 
outside of farming, in the laboratories of the supply companies, the universities 
and the agricultural research institutes.  Farmers were seen to have little 
influence over the process or its consequences, other than the rate at which they 
chose to take up the technologies available.  But even in this regard, competitive 
pressures made them very susceptible to new techniques that lowered 
production costs and enhanced productivity.  The ‘technological treadmill’ is 
widely used to characterise this dependency (Ward, 1993). 
 
The role of farmers as environmental managers emphasises a different model of 
technological change - that of farmers as adapters and not simply adopters of 
available technology. Whereas a key role of technology in the past has been to 
overcome and eliminate environmental variability and constraints, now, 
conversely, the emphasis is on farmers carefully adapting technology to respect 
environmental variability.  The farmers' operational knowledge therefore must 
not just be derivative of the agricultural scientists' and technologists' but must 
also draw upon an intimate understanding of the farm environment and its 
physical, ecological and meteorological variability.  Farm-based strategies for 
environmental management must thus combine scientific and indigenous 
knowledge (Murdoch and Clark, 1994). 
 
There are various formal methods for integrating the environment into farm 
management.  These include farm waste management plans, farm conservation 
plans, farm sustainability plans and codes of good practice.  One indication of 
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progress would be the extent to which farmers have taken up and implemented 
such methods.  Conservation advice obviously has an important role to play and 
is being incorporated into farm advisory and extension services.  This can be 
done to a token or marginal extent, or it can be given a more central role - a 
possible indicator would be the proportion of farm advice devoted to 
conservation and environmental protection.  At the same time, the vertical 
integration of farmers needs to be counteracted to reduce their technological 
dependency and instead horizontal networks promoted that expand the self-
monitoring and learning capacity of farmers in relation to their local 
environment (Winter, 1997).  Examples would include farmer self-help groups 
oriented towards conservation and farmer-environmentalist networks.  Another 
indicator would be the spread of such groups. 
 
5.3.3 Integration of Environmental Objectives into Agricultural Policy Making 
 
Environmental issues and concerns represent a challenge for traditional 
functions of government that are organised along sectoral lines.  The gathering 
debate over sustainable development led in the 1980s to a new emphasis on 
seeking to establish a more synoptic environmental policy with co-ordinated 
environmental goals integrated into each sector.  Potentially, this had a number 
of dimensions: at the strategic level - a global approach to the setting and 
monitoring of environmental objectives; at the sectoral level - an emphasis on 
integrating environmental goals into sectoral objectives  (e.g. the greening of 
transport, tourism etc.); at the level of policy instruments - use of tools such as 
cross-compliance, contracts and environmental assessment procedures. 
 
The commonly identified barriers to integration involve both a political and an 
organisational aspect.  In the case of the former, a traditional problem for 
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environmental policy has been its relatively low priority on the political agenda, 
reflecting the dominant attachment of governments to the imperative of 
economic growth.  Environmental protection has generally been treated as 
something of a luxury to be afforded in times of economic prosperity, or to be 
traded off against material goals.  Moreover, environmental problems are often 
deep-seated and many environmental policies only promise benefits in the long 
term which means that they are often ignored or sacrificed in political systems 
geared up for short term electoral or economic cycles.  Sectoral economic 
policies, on the other hand, tend to be supported by strong producer 
organisations whose members are usually directly and significantly affected by 
government action, in contrast to the diffuse public benefits yielded by 
environmental policy.  In consequence, environmental policy may lack the 
weight to compete for resources or challenge the policy assumptions of other 
issue arenas and can be marginalised within institutional structures.   
 
In terms of organisational barriers Governmental bureaucracies tend to be 
highly compartmentalised which means they are not well designed to absorb 
cross-cutting environmental concerns.  The approach to integration adopted will 
depend upon the degree of formal power or authority at the disposal of the 
environment ministry.  Among EU member states, most environment ministries 
have only recently been established: the oldest have been in existence for less 
than 25 years and some (as in Italy and Spain) for less than ten (Wilkinson, 
1997).  Traditions of policy making and styles of regulation differ between 
sectors and with the approach adopted in environmental policy.  The integration 
of environmental objectives is therefore obviously not an overnight process.  
There is likely to be a different pace between states and some policy sectors will 
respond more readily than others.   
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In most European countries, agriculture has traditionally been a particularly 
closed policy community embracing agriculture ministries and mainstream 
farming lobbies but to the exclusion of other interests.  For a long time 
agricultural policy communities resisted both the imposition of environmental 
constraints and the incursion of environmental interests.  The acceptance of 
agri-environmental schemes and measures therefore represents a positive 
departure but does not necessarily imply integration as much as the defensive 
co-option of certain environmental issues and values by the agricultural policy 
community. 
 
The devising and implementation of effective agri-environment policies, 
however, calls for the involvement of organised environmental interests.  Where 
environmental agencies or lobbies are weak or still remain excluded, there are 
limited counter-pressures to the complete internalisation of agri-environment 
policies within the agricultural bureaucracy which can result in very little public 
debate or independent evidence about the nature, purpose or achievements of 
such policies. 
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Figure 7  Dimensions of Integration at the Policy Level 
 
♦ Environmental Impact Assessments - To what extent are these carried out 
in the sector?   Is their use ex-ante or ex-post? 
 
♦ Consultation - What degree of consultation takes place with authorities 
having environmental competences at the local, national and EU levels?  
Does it reflect co-decision making or is it merely symbolic? 
 
♦ Compatibility -  When producing legislation  and regulations for the sector, 
is compatibility with environmental legislation assessed? 
 
♦ Monitoring and Evaluation - Is any systematic evaluation of the 
environmental consequences of policies, research or economic activities 
conducted? 
 
♦ Funding - Is funding made available for environmentally friendly actions in 
the sector and on what scale? 
 Source:  Liberatore, 1997 
 
Environmental integration must clearly involve institutional change.  Liberatore 
(1997) in attempting to set up a framework for measuring the different degrees 
of integration across sectors highlights the five major dimensions in Figure 7.  
Coverage of each of these dimensions in full and on a regular basis would imply 
complete integration.  However, when they are pursued on an ad hoc and 
limited basis then environmental integration may be diluted, having little impact 
on certain sectors. 
 
Hey (1997) distinguishes three types of approaches to integration that different 
sectors have adopted: defensive, indirect and active integration.  Defensive 
integration attempts to contain and offset possible environmental side effects 
arising from the policies already being pursued in the sector; indirect integration 
arises where existing sectoral policies give rise to positive environmental 
benefits but largely as unintended side effects; active integration occurs where 
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planned environmental targets, objectives and policy instruments are adopted 
within a sector.  Such embedding of environmental integration into sectoral 
decision making processes is likely to require modifications to organisational 
structure.  So far, it would seem, the integration of environmental objectives 
into agricultural policy has involved varying degrees of defensive and indirect 
integration. 
 
5.4 Process Indicators in Present Agri-environment Schemes 
 
It is possible to detect features of the present policy situation which provoke 
optimism in the assessment of agri-environment policy.   Thus, in operating 
ESAs, MAFF has delegated the day to day management of individual sites to 
managers on the ground who are already well familiar with farmers in the region 
if not necessarily in the locality to which they are assigned.  Further, as part of 
the process of managing its agri-environment policies, MAFF established a 
National Agri-environmental Forum, which first met in March 1996, on which 
twenty organisations are represented.  There are also Regional Agri-
environmental Consultation Groups in the nine MAFF Regions with the purpose 
to “review the operation of schemes at the regional level and enable expertise of 
local organisations to be harnessed” (Agriculture Committee, 1997).  The 
existence of such institutional relationships and groups offers a key opportunity 
for ‘process monitoring’ in contrast with the many official studies which 
assemble information relating to output on a ‘top down’ basis. 
 
The combination of flexibility and managerial discretion of Countryside 
Stewardship ensured close working contact between Countryside Commission 
staff and farmers.  Their shared interest in the management process produced a 
positive ‘feel’ to the scheme.  As it develops under MAFF management it will 
be interesting to see how the scheme evolves further.  For the time being it 
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retains flexibility and discretion (Coates, 1997).  The Stewardship process is 
also amenable to incorporation of the Countryside Character concept and is now 
being targeted taking this system into account at the level of Regional Agri-
environmental Consultation Groups.  This process involves English Nature and 
the Countryside Commission as well as other agencies and individuals in the 
establishment of targets for Stewardship. 
 
5.5 Conclusion: Indicator Practice 
 
The effective integration of environmental objectives into agriculture at all 
levels entails changed social relationships and institutional structures linked to 
altered interpretive frames on the part of those responsible.  While it is possible 
now to gather systematic evidence of the extent to which these changes towards 
a sustainable system are taking place, it will be some years before the specific 
environmental outcomes of recent policy developments can be judged.  The 
current preoccupation with physical environmental indicators is therefore 
somewhat unfortunate.  It represents a typical case of means-ends displacement.  
After all, it is permanently sustainable socio-economic systems that we should 
be striving for, not some sort of environmental end-state.  But the need for 
social and institutional change always makes powerful groups and technocrats 
uneasy, despite its inevitability.  The recent institutional changes associated 
with agri-environmental policy are sufficient to encourage optimism for the 
final outcomes of these policies, many of which will appear during the next 
century. 
 
Optimism may be justified by reference to the institutionalisation of the 
management of ESAs at the national and regional level in England to broaden 
participation of those interested in the outcome of those policies.  The rapid 
extension of Countryside Stewardship contracts through the non-designated 
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countryside, increasing the number of flexibly negotiated contracts with 
individual farmers would also encourage expectations of more sustainable 
policies. 
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